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It is not known how many wills fail due to non-compliance with the formalities set out in s9 Wills Act 
1837,1 but strict application of the formalities requirements can frustrate the testator’s intentions.2  
Although the presumptions of due execution have occasionally enabled the English courts to take a 
liberal approach to the witnessing requirements,3 and the ‘strong public interest in valid testamentary 
dispositions being upheld’ has recently been noted,4 there is no discretion by which the court can 
overlook proven imperfections.5  The Law Commission’s proposal to introduce a dispensing power 
would enable the courts to admit a will to probate despite non-compliance with formalities.6 They 
argue this will ensure testamentary freedom and avoid the ‘unsatisfactory consequence’ of an 
intestacy.7  However it is important that the scope and extent of these powers is considered carefully.   
This series of three articles will briefly explain the justifications for dispensing powers, and will 
examine the different attributes of the dispensing powers in Australia, New Zealand, the USA (under 
the Uniform Probate Code) and South Africa.  There will be greater analysis throughout of the 
Australian caselaw, partly because the testamentary formalities of the Australian states are most 
closely aligned with those in England8 and partly because this is where dispensing powers have been 
in place for longest.   The diversity amongst the models of dispensing powers, and the competing 
tensions inherent in the exercise of them, will be demonstrated and these findings will be used to 
identify the key considerations for the Law Commission if dispensing powers are to be introduced in 
England and Wales.   
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1 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.90.  The Law Reform Committee’s Twenty-
Second Report (The Making and Revocation of Wills) (1980) (Cmnd 7902) previously rejected the notion of a 
dispensing power partly because only a “tiny minority” of wills failed due to formalities defects (para 2.5) 
2 Ahluwalia v Singh [2011] EWHC 2907 (Ch) [127] 
3 For example Weatherhill v Pearce [1995] 1 WLR 592, in which a will that appeared to be validly signed and 
witnessed was upheld in the absence of ‘clear evidence of non-compliance.’ (598 (Kolbert HHJ)) 
4 Payne v Payne [2018] EWCA Civ 985 [45] 
5 Re Groffman [1969] 2 All ER 108 
6 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) Chapter 5 
7 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) paras 5.87-5.88 
8 In particular the Australian states do not permit holograph wills, but these are widely accepted across the 
USA.  
  
The Argument for Dispensing Powers 
Whilst it is logical that a will that was made without testamentary intent but otherwise complies with 
the formalities will not be valid,9 the rationale for the converse situation which invalidates the will of 
a testator who had testamentary intent but did not comply with the formalities is less clear.  The 
solution advocated by Professor John Langbein in 197510 was to take a functionalist approach to 
formalities; Langbein reasoned that the formalities serve a purpose but that they are not, in 
themselves, essential for the creation of a valid will.  The statutory formalities are generally seen to 
perform four main functions: 
1. Evidentiary – both that the will was made by the testator, and to provide clear evidence of the 
testator’s wishes 
2. Cautionary – alerting the testator to the serious nature of the document so that it is given due 
consideration 
3. Channelling – the testator knows that they have carried out an accepted and well-defined 
method of disposing of their property on death 
4. Protective – shielding the testator from fraud and undue influence.11 
Together, the formalities provide evidence that the testator intended to make the will, that it reflects 
the testator’s intentions and was freely entered into by the testator. Due compliance with the 
formalities raises a presumption of this, saving the courts from having to analyse each will in detail.  
Langbein’s proposal was that, instead of non-compliance automatically rendering a will void, it should 
be possible for ‘the proponents in cases of defective execution to prove what they are now entitled 
to presume from due execution – the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfilment of the Wills 
Act purposes’.12  However it is implicit within this functionalist approach to testamentary formalities 
that these functions should be adequately performed in another way; to do otherwise creates 
uncertainty, risks a person creating a legally binding document inadvertently, or increases the risk of 
fraud.   
There are two disparate mechanisms by which these powers might operate.  The first is to consider 
whether there has been ‘substantial compliance’ with the formalities.  This was the approach first 
                                                          
9 Lister v Smith (1863) 164 ER 1282 
10 Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review (1975) 489 
11 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.6.  These were expounded in Langbein’s 
1975 article and for the purposes of this article it will be accepted that all four perform some function in the 
attestation formalities. 
12 Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review 489, 513 
  
advocated by Langbein in 197513 and it was adopted by Queensland in 1981.14  However a strict judicial 
interpretation of the requirement for substantial compliance resulted in very few successful cases, 
and Langbein later described the measure as a ‘flop’.15   
The alternative is to consider whether, notwithstanding the defect in attestation, the testator 
demonstrated testamentary intention in creating the document.16  A statutory dispensing power that 
took this approach was introduced in South Australia in 197517 and since then has spread across a 
number of common law countries.18  The advantage of such a flexible approach is that there is no need 
to try to predict the way in which a testator will fail to comply with the formalities.  The South 
Australian dispensing power was described by Langbein as ‘a triumph of law reform’19 and it is this 
model that is preferred by the Law Commission, observing that the history of Queensland’s substantial 
compliance doctrine is ‘a cautionary tale’.20   
It is hardly surprising that the intention based approach won out over the substantial compliance 
model.  Testamentary intention is already a requirement for a valid will, so detailed consideration of 
intention is not a novel concept for the courts.21  Indeed, the Law Commission has suggested that 
judicial analysis of the evidence to establish testamentary intention may ‘offer more protection than 
adherence to a particular form.’22  However this article will demonstrate that not all of the principles 
of testamentary intention translate easily from validly executed wills to non-Wills Act 1837 compliant 
wills, and that the goal of prioritising the testator’s intentions raises complex questions about the 
application of dispensing powers.     
                                                          
13 Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review 489, 489 and 515-
516 
14 Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 9 
15 Langbein, ‘Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in 
Probate Law’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 1, 1 
16 As Langbein expressed it in 1975, they have shown ‘intent to use the probate system, intent to make a will.’ 
– Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review 489, 524 
17 Wills Act 1936 (SA), s 12(2) 
18 The first state in Australia to adopt a dispensing power was South Australia in 1975 with the enactment of s 
12(2) Wills Act 1936.  Other states followed suit and all now have a dispensing power.  Further examples can 
be seen in s 2(3) Wills Act 1953 in South Africa, added in 1992, the Uniform Probate Code in the USA (s 2-503) 
and the Canadian Uniform Wills Act 2000 s 19.1  
19 Langbein, ‘Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in 
Probate Law’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 1, 1 
20 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.83  
21 In England, questions of testamentary intention have been prevalent in the context of privileged wills made 
under s 11 Wills Act 1837, discussed below.  See also Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ 
(1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review 489, 514 
22 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.86 
  
The Terms of the Statutory Dispensing Powers 
The original South Australian dispensing power has been re-drafted twice since its inception in 1975; 
Langbein suggested that the original statutory provision ‘was not a carefully considered product.’23  
The plethora of slightly differently worded provisions within Australia alone demonstrates that there 
is no clear consensus as to exactly what the scope (or indeed the limitations) of an intention-based 
dispensing power should be.  Despite their differences, there are noticeable similarities in that all of 
them include requirements that there is a document, that the document contains the testamentary 
intentions of the deceased and that the deceased intended the document to constitute his or her 
will.24  The following three questions, set out in Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris, have been adopted by the 
courts in their application of dispensing powers across Australia and best sum up the Australian 
requirements: 
a. was there a document? 
b. did that document purport to embody the testamentary intentions of the relevant Deceased? 
c. did the evidence satisfy the Court that, either, at the time of the subject document being 
brought into being, or, at some later time, the relevant Deceased, by some act or words, 
demonstrated that it was her, or his, then intention that the subject document 
should, without more on her, or his, part operate as her, or his, Will?25 
Similarly, there is no comprehensive probate law covering all of the USA, but the Uniform Probate 
Code does contain a dispensing power (known as the ‘harmless error’ provision) in the following 
terms: 
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance 
with Section 2-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance 
with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute:  
(1) the decedent’s will…26 
                                                          
23 Langbein, ‘Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in 
Probate Law’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 1, 10 
24 Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 11A; Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 8; Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 10; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) 
s 18; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 10; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 9; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 32; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12(2) 
25 Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001] NSWCA 408 [56] (emphasis in original).  This case was applying s 18A of the 
Wills Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) and has since been followed in the other states. 
26 Uniform Probate Code, s 2-503  
  
Only ten states have adopted the harmless error provision, and out of those ten, three (California, 
Virginia and Ohio) have opted for a more limited version of this provision that still requires the will to 
be signed by the deceased27 whilst Colorado requires the deceased to have signed or acknowledged 
the document.28 
In South Africa their Condonation Principle enables a document to be admitted to probate if the court 
is satisfied that the document was ‘drafted or executed by a person who has died since the drafting 
or execution thereof [and] was intended to be his will or an amendment of his will’.29   
Finally New Zealand has been the most recent adopter of a dispensing power, introducing the 
following provision in 2007: ‘The High Court may make an order declaring the document valid, if it is 
satisfied that the document expresses the deceased person’s testamentary intentions.’30  This is the 
briefest of all of the dispensing powers considered in this article. 
It is immediately noticeable that all of these provisions require that there be a ‘document’, 
emphasising the importance of the evidential function, but the definition of a document differs.  In 
New Zealand, ‘document’ is confined to written records31 but this has been held to include transcripts 
of audio recordings, even if those transcripts are created after the death of the deceased.32  In 
Australia the current statutory requirements define ‘document’ to include both hard and soft copy 
documents and recordings33 and these have been used to admit DVD recordings and documents on 
computers, iPhones and USB sticks to probate,34 along with text messages.35  The Law Commission’s 
consultation echoes the Australian provisions, proposing that the dispensing power be drawn widely 
enough to cover both traditional documents and electronic or audio-visual recordings36 although there 
                                                          
27 D Horton, ‘Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence From California’ (2018) 103 Iowa Law Review 1, 15.  A 
number of states also permit holograph wills though, which may lessen the perceived need for adoption of a 
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28 Colorado Revised Statutes s 15–11–503(2) 
29 Wills Act 1953 (SA) s 2(3) 
30 Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 14(2) 
31 Wills Act 2007, s 6 and Interpretation Act 1999, s 29 
32 Pfaender v Gregory [2018] NZHC 161 [33]-[34] 
33 N Peart, ‘Testamentary Formalities in Australia and New Zealand’ in K G C Reid, MJ De Waal and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Comparative Succession Law: Testamentary Formalities (OUP 2011) 351.  See, for example, 
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 32, Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 10, Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 10, Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 9, Succession 
Act 1981 (Qld) s 5, Succession Act (NSW) s 3, Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 4 
34 Langbein, ‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act; Dispensing Power in the United States: Emulation, 
Resistance, Expansion’ (2017) 38 Adelaide Law Review 1, 9-10  
35 Nichol v Nichol [2017] QSC 220 
36 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.95  
  
would be a requirement for some form of ‘record’, to perform both the evidentiary and protective 
functions of the formalities.37   
In the absence of a statutory provision for electronic wills38 a dispensing power would be the only 
means by which an electronic record could be admitted to probate.39   Whilst the potential flexibility 
of dispensing powers to adapt to twenty-first century methods of documentation has been noted,40 
concerns have also been raised in the United States about the impact on litigation.41  However the 
focus of this article is on the rest of the provisions, which also vary widely between jurisdictions.  The 
Law Commission’s consultation proposes a dispensing power that would ‘apply to records 
demonstrating testamentary intention’42 but does not analyse ‘testamentary intention’ in any further 
detail.  This raises the following questions, which are of fundamental importance in defining the scope 
of an intention-based dispensing power: 
1. What must be intended? 
2. How is this intention proved? 
3. What is the appropriate standard of proof? 
4. When must the deceased have held this intention? 
The first of these questions is considered below, and the remaining ones will be addressed in two 
subsequent articles.  
What must be Intended? 
The concept of testamentary intention – the intention that the testator’s wishes are to take effect on 
his death43 – has received very little analysis to date, probably because it is relatively simple to infer 
testamentary intention from a formal document that proclaims itself to be a will.  Most of the existing 
body of English caselaw on testamentary intent is in the context of privileged wills,44 for which there 
                                                          
37 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.98 
38 See Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) Chapter 6 for a discussion of the 
considerations for the introduction of electronic wills. 
39 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) paras 6.110-6.112 
40 Langbein, ‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act; Dispensing Power in the United States: Emulation, 
Resistance, Expansion’ (2017) 38 Adelaide Law Review 1; Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 
2017) paras 5.94-5.99  
41 Horton, ‘Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism’ (2017) 58(1) Boston College 
Law Review 1, 33 
42 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) Consultation Question 28 
43 B Sloan, Borkowski’s Law of Succession (OUP, 3rd edn, 2017) 82 
44 Wills made by members of the armed forces and mariners at sea under s 11 Wills Act 1837.  Such wills do 
not require witnesses and can be oral. 
  
are no prescribed formalities.  Intention is therefore all; a privileged testator need not know that they 
are making a will or even that they are able to make a will,45 but they must know that they are making 
a statement as to how they wish their property to be distributed upon their death.46  The courts have 
been required to identify testamentary intention from a variety of informal statements reportedly 
made by the deceased, often many years after the event.47  They have distinguished between mere 
statements of information (for example the deceased describing what he believed to be the case) and 
those intended as a request to be acted on (including instructions for a will),48 only the latter of which 
has been held to demonstrate testamentary intent.  Unfortunately the differentiation is easier to 
achieve in theory than in practice, especially when statements were made casually; it has been 
questioned whether the validity of a will should turn on such fine distinctions.49   
Similar difficulties can be seen in the caselaw from the USA on holographic wills.  Whilst there is no 
need for the deceased to intend the document to be a will in the formal sense, the deceased must 
intend it to make gifts that will take effect on death – there must be a donative intent.50  The holograph 
will in Re Kuralt51 was an informal letter, which made its true nature hard to discern.  The Montana 
Supreme Court’s decision in Re Kuralt has been criticised on the basis that the letter was merely setting 
out future intentions to create a will and was not a will itself.52  As many putative wills propounded 
under dispensing powers will be informal documents an inference of intention will be much less 
straightforward than with a formal will; a transition away from a formalistic approach towards an 
intention-based one therefore necessitates greater clarity on what testamentary intention really 
means.53 
The Australian dispensing powers identify two different types of intention.  First of all the document 
must set out the deceased’s testamentary intentions and secondly the deceased must have intended 
it to be their will – these form the second and third limbs of the Hatsatouris test set out above.  This 
separates the deceased’s general testamentary intention (“these are the terms on which I want to 
make my will”) from specific testamentary intention (“this is my will”).  The former could include 
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46 Re Knibbs [1962] 1 WLR 852, 855-856 
47 Re Servoz-Gavin [2009] EWHC 3168 (Ch) 
48 Re Knibbs [1962] 1 WLR 852, 855-856; Re Stable [1919] P 7, 9 
49 Sloan, Borkowski’s Law of Succession (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 84-85 
50 M Glover, ‘A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent’ (2016) 23 George Mason Law Review 569, 582-587 
51 Re Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931 (Mont. 2000)     
52 J B Baron, ‘Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law’ (2016) 73(1) Washington and Lee Law 
Review 3, 37; Glover, ‘A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent’ (2016) 23 George Mason Law Review 569, 586 
53 Glover, ‘A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent’ (2016) 23 George Mason Law Review 569, 603 
  
letters of instruction to solicitors, draft wills that remain unsigned, and even correspondence with 
friends and family stating that there is an intention to make a will in specific terms.  The latter limits 
the use of the dispensing power to documents that purport to be a will.  The deceased must intend 
‘the document to take effect as a testamentary disposition, a disposition of property upon his 
death.’54    
This requirement for specific testamentary intention can also be seen in the Harmless Error provision 
of the Uniform Probate Code (‘evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to 
constitute…[their] will’) and the South African Condonation Principle (‘a document…was intended to 
be his will’.)  In contrast New Zealand has adopted only general testamentary intention, requiring 
merely that the document ‘expresses the deceased person’s testamentary intentions’.55  
Unsurprisingly this difference has a noticeable effect; in Re Campbell56 it was noted that of 
approximately eighty cases that had been heard in New Zealand at the time, only four cases had been 
unsuccessful and two of those failed because the document in question pre-dated the legislation.57  
Although many of the applications were unopposed, Mackenzie J concluded that ‘the preponderance 
of successful applications does however indicate that the evidential burden on a s 14 applicant is not 
subject to a high threshold’.58 The absence of a requirement for specific testamentary intention has 
enabled instructions for a will to be admitted to probate in New Zealand,59 including a telephone note 
made by the deceased’s solicitor that the deceased had not seen.60  
In contrast the effect of a requirement for specific testamentary intention can be seen in the New 
Jersey appeal case of Macool61 in which an unsigned draft will, prepared according to the deceased’s 
instructions but which the deceased never had an opportunity to review, was refused probate under 
the New Jersey statutory provision that adopted the harmless error provision in full.62 The statutory 
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55 Interestingly, the South Australian Wills Act 1936 did not include a requirement for specific intent between 
1994, with the enactment of the Wills (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 1994, and 1998 when the Statutes 
Amendment (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) Act 1998 re-introduced it. 
56 Re Campbell (deceased) [2014] NZHC 1632 
57 Ibid, [17].  By s 5 Wills Amendment Act 2012 (NZ) the requirement that the will must post-date 31 October 
2007 was repealed and s 14 of the Wills Act 2007 (NZ) now applies for any deaths on or after 1 November 
2007.  
58 Ibid 
59 Pfaender v Gregory [2018] NZHC 161  
60 Re Feron [2012] NZHC 44 
61 Re Macool 3 A.3d 1258 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2010)   
62 New Jersey Statutes 3B:3-3, which states ‘Although a document or writing added upon a document was not 
executed in compliance with N.J.S.3B:3-2, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in 
  
test was that the testator intended a particular document to constitute her will63 and this required 
evidence that ‘(1) the decedent actually reviewed the document in question; and (2) thereafter gave 
his or her final assent to it.’64  On the facts, although the deceased had intended to make a will in those 
terms, she had never seen the draft will so the court could not ‘conclude, with any degree of 
reasonable certainty, that [the will] would have met with decedent’s approval.’65   
The Supreme Court of Queensland took an arguably stricter approach in Mahlo v Hehir66 when they 
refused to admit a draft will found on the deceased’s computer because she knew she needed to print 
and sign it for it to have legal effect, despite acknowledging that the deceased intended to make a will 
in those terms and that the outcome was ‘far from satisfactory’.67 However the statutory 
requirements for specific testamentary intent have not always been strictly (or consistently) applied.  
For example in the earlier Queensland case of Trust Company Ltd v Oates68 a record of the testator’s 
unsigned instructions for a will were admitted to probate, as Mullins J was ‘satisfied that there is a 
written document that records the testamentary intentions of the deceased’.69  More recently, in 
Borthwick v Mitchell,70 notes dictated by the deceased shortly before his death were found to comply 
with the specific intention requirement despite that fact that they were neither signed nor reviewed 
by the deceased.71 
Similar confusion can be seen in the United States.  In the Californian case of Re Caspary72 the 
propounded document was the deceased’s instructions to his attorney, with whom he met the 
following day.  Some aspects of the instructions were still tentative, with question marks against them.  
The attorney subsequently prepared a will in accordance with those instructions but the deceased 
never met him to approve or execute it.  Despite the will instructions being signed it is highly unlikely 
that the deceased intended that document to be his will, yet the will was admitted under the 
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evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (1) the decedent's will…” 
63 Re Macool 3 A.3d 1258, 1264 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2010) 
64 Ibid, 1265 (Fuentes JAD) 
65 ibid 
66 Mahlo v Hehir [2011] QSC 243 
67 Ibid [41]-[45] 
68 Trust Company Ltd v Oates [2009] QSC 282 
69 Ibid, 287 (emphasis added) 
70 Borthwick v Mitchell [2017] NSWSC 1145 
71 Ibid, [91].  It is interesting to note that Re Knibbs was used in this judgement to support the finding by 
distinguishing between mere statements of information and statements of the deceased’s wishes for the 
disposition of his property. 
72 Estate of Caspary, at 1, No. RP08396884 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan 28, 2009), cited in Horton, ‘Partial Harmless 
Error for Wills: Evidence From California’ (2018) 103 Iowa Law Review 1   
  
dispensing power.73  Furthermore in the New Jersey appeal case of Re Ehrlich74  the deceased’s actual 
will could not be located after his death but an unsigned copy was propounded.  It was noted on the 
copy that the original had been sent to his executor, but the executor had pre-deceased.  The original 
will had not been seen for some years, but there had been comments by the deceased that indicated 
that he had made a will in the terms set out in the copy.  However there was also evidence that he 
had changed his mind about one of the gifts.75 The court applied the Macool tests and concluded that 
the unexecuted document ‘was reviewed and assented to by decedent and accurately reflects his final 
testamentary wishes’.76  This case was cited with approval by the Law Commission as a good example 
of the utility of dispensing powers77 but this emphasis on the deceased’s general testamentary 
intention disguises the fact that it is doubtful the deceased could really be said to have assented to a 
copy in the same way that one would assent to an original document.78   
It appears to be rather too easy to slide between questions of specific or general testamentary 
intent,79 especially when there is clear evidence of the deceased’s wishes and these differ markedly 
from the alternative distribution of the estate.80  Indeed, the Law Commission’s consultation paper 
appears to conflate the two; when citing the New South Wales case of MacDonald v MacDonald81 the 
consultation states that a suicide note was ‘an expression of testamentary intentions and treated as a 
will’82 when the court’s decision was in fact that the deceased intended the relevant paragraphs ‘to 
form his will’.83 
Langbein’s original argument was that strict compliance with the formalities could lead to inequitable 
results,84 but should dispensing powers give ‘judges the freewheeling power to admit any statement 
                                                          
73 Horton, ‘Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence From California’ (2018) 103 Iowa Law Review 1, 39 
74 In re Estate of Ehrlich 47 A.3d 12 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2012) 
75 Ibid, 18. The lack of evidence of the signed will may have prevented a claim for the original to be admitted to 
probate as a lost will, because the relevant New Jersey statute requires evidence of the witnesses or another 
person with knowledge of the execution – N.J.S 3B:3-19 
76 In re Estate of Ehrlich 47 A.3d 12, 19 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2012) (emphasis added) 
77 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.84. Copy wills can be admitted to probate in 
England under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, r 54 without the need for a dispensing power. 
78 Baron, ‘Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law’ (2016) 73(1) Washington and Lee Law Review 3, 
43 
79 Ibid, 37 
80 Baron, ‘Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law’ (2016) 73(1) Washington and Lee Law Review 3, 
43; see, for example, Borthwick v Mitchell [2017] NSWSC 1145 
81 MacDonald v MacDonald [2012] NSWSC 1376 
82 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.84 
83 MacDonald v MacDonald [2012] NSWSC 1376 [13] (White J) 
84 Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review 489, 500-501 
  
of dispositive wishes into probate?’85  There is a risk of increased leniency in cases in which the alleged 
beneficiaries are perceived to have a right to inherit, but just because someone should have made a 
will does not mean they have done so.   
In Ehrlich the court discounted the fact that the document did not fully reflect the testator’s wishes at 
the time of his death because the changes that the deceased wanted did not alter the primary 
beneficiary of the estate who was ‘the natural object of decedent's bounty’.86 This discussion suggests 
that the court was influenced by the knowledge that the alternative intestacy distribution was even 
further from the deceased’s general testamentary wishes than the unsigned will.87 
These intention problems are exacerbated by the informality of home-made documents, and the 
inclusion of electronic messages and recordings would multiply exponentially the potential number of 
documents submitted to court for determination.  The Law Commission acknowledged that a wide 
definition of ‘document’ could encourage disappointed relatives to scour through ‘a huge number of 
texts, emails and other records in order to find one that could be put forward as a will on the basis of 
a dispensing power’.88  Restricting the dispensing power to instances where specific testamentary 
intent can be proved would preclude the dispensing power from operating on the deceased’s un-
concluded musings and deliberations; whilst the cases discussed above demonstrate that this has not 
always been strictly adhered to, it is the only way to prevent the fine distinctions and uncertainties 
seen in privileged wills caselaw from entering into the ambit of dispensing powers.  
Conclusion 
So far, this article has demonstrated that the concept of testamentary intention is not as clear as the 
Law Commission would, perhaps, like.  In the next two parts the remaining questions will be 
addressed, namely: 
2. How is this intention to be proved? 
3. What is the appropriate standard of proof? 
4. When must the deceased have held this intention? 
                                                          
85 Horton, ‘Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism’ (2017) 58(1) Boston College 
Law Review 1, 20 
86 In re Estate of Ehrlich 47 A.3d 12, 18 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2012) 
87 In contrast in one of the few unsuccessful New Zealand cases, Fitzgibbons v Fitzmaurice [2014] NZHC 710, 
although the document was refused on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity it was noted that a prior will 
was ‘was made in terms entirely appropriate to his family situation’ ([44]). 
88 Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com No 231, 2017) para 5.96 
  
The answers to these questions will identify the principles that need to be considered if any future 
dispensing powers were to have a chance of operating successfully in England and Wales.   
 
